Using a unique dataset of art auctions on eBay, we conduct an empirical analysis of the value of a seller's online reputation. Several aspects distinguish our work from most existing research. We analyze a heterogeneous panel data consisting of a large number of observations over a large period of time, including signi…cant variation in reputation across and within sellers. The panel structure of our dataset allows us to employ …xed e¤ects techniques to control for observed and unobserved di¤erences across auctions. The existing literature suggests a marginally signi…cant, and small in magnitude, impact of reputation on sale price. In contrast, our results point to a highly signi…cant, and sizable, impact of reputation on the behavior of buyers and sellers and on market outcomes. The data suggest that sellers on eBay exert signi…cant e¤ort to avoid a negative feedback. Our analysis reveals a signi…cant impact of the eBay feedback rating large enough to be consistent with this observation.
INTRODUCTION.
Online auction markets have attracted the attention of artists interested in o¤ering their work for sale directly to potential buyers. Tens of thousands of works of art are available for sale each day in online auction markets like eBay.com, currently the largest market online; overstock.com; yahoo.com; or auction markets specialized on the sale of artwork, like artbyus.com. Because each work of art is unique, its selling price may be di¢ cult to determine ex-ante. Auctions relieve the seller of the responsibility of setting a price.
Not surprisingly, original art is frequently sold in an auction environment (Ashenfelter and Graddy, 2002 and 2003) . Furthermore, online auction markets like eBay reduce the cost of the match between buyers and sellers and reduce the need of a middleman or art gallery.
Winning an auction on eBay is only the …rst step in an online transaction. Before the sale is completed, the buyer has to pay the …nal auction price and trust that the seller will deliver the product as agreed, at a later date. The seller may be more inclined to carry out the agreement promptly, and to resolve any issues that may arise in a manner agreeable to the buyer, if she wants to maintain a good reputation. At the end of each transaction on eBay, the buyer and the seller have a chance to rate their level of satisfaction with the transaction (positive, neutral, negative). The type of score, or feedback, received by the seller in all previous transactions is readily available to potential buyers, along with a summary measure representing positive feedbacks as a percentage of the positive and negative feedback received. Ben-Ner and Putterman (2002) study the importance of trust in economic transactions paying special attention to the New Economy. As their study suggests, reputation mechanisms like the one implemented in eBay may increase the level of trust among market participants and can result in signi…cant welfare gains.
In this paper we undertake an empirical study of the impact of an artist's online reputation on market outcomes using a unique dataset of art auctions on eBay. We analyze a panel of art auctions from artists who post their work for sale on eBay regularly. Our data consist of a large number of art auctions over a long period of time, including signi…cant variation in reputation across and within sellers, as well as signi…cant variation in other relevant characteristics, such as style (e.g., abstract, cubist), medium (e.g., acrylic, oil), ground (e.g., stretch canvas, cardboard), and size. Our results suggest that, at least for auctions for heterogeneous goods of uncertain value (the type considered in this study) the seller's reputation matters a great deal.
Several studies have analyzed the impact of a seller's eBay reputation on the …nal auction price using cross-sectional techniques. The overall conclusion from these studies is that the impact of a bad reputation on the sale price is small. Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) …nd that a negative reputation has a signi…cant negative impact on the number of bidders but does not signi…cantly impact the …nal auction price. Melnik and Alm (2002) estimate that the impact of negative feedback is signi…cant but very small in magnitude, and the same holds for the impact of the overall rating. Houser and Wooders (2005) estimate that the average cost to sellers stemming from neutral or negative reputation scores is less than one percent (0.93%) of the …nal sales price. Lucking-Reiley, Bryan, Prasad, and Reeves estimate that a one percent increase in positive/negative feedback increase/reduce sale price by only 0.03% and 0.11% respectively. Bajari and Hortacsu (2004) review this evidence and conclude: "We believe that these results are likely to signi…cantly understate the returns from having a good reputation...Since getting positive feedback requires e¤ort on the part of sellers, it appears that sellers are making e¤orts to avoid negative feedback..." Our analysis indicates that eBay reputation has a signi…cant impact on market outcomes, large enough to be consistent with their observation. Livingston (2005) addresses the issue from a di¤erent perspective by focusing the attention on the number of positive feedbacks rather than on the impact of a negative reputation.
His analysis suggests that sellers are strongly rewarded for the …rst few positive feedback ratings but additional instances of positive feedback have a small impact. Perhaps surprisingly, when the author considers the impact of negative and neutral feedback (see table 6) on bidding behavior, he obtains the associated coe¢ cient to be of the same sign as that associated with positive feedback.
A potential problem with cross-sectional studies is that they rely on variation in feedback rating across sellers in order to identify the impact of the feedback rating on market outcomes. This identi…cation strategy relies on the assumption that there are no confounding unobserved di¤erences across sellers a¤ecting market outcomes. In general, within-sellers' variation in feedback ratings would be a preferable source of identifying information. One possible reason why previous studies have not considered this approach may be because negative feedbacks is extremely rare. In particular, Melnik and Alm (2002) consider a sample of 450 auctions, and Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) consider a sample of 407 auctions. In both studies, the probability of a bad reputation is about 0.0002. In our data, the probability of a bad feedback is 0.00026. Thus, to be able to conduct a panel data analysis with su¢ cient variation in feedback ratings we need data on a large sample of auctions, from a relatively large number of sellers, over a large period of time. Their results indicate that the stablished seller fared better. They also compared sales by relatively new sellers with and without negative feedback. In their data, a small number of negative feedback did not a¤ect buyers'willigness-to-pay. The analysis in our paper indicates that a negative feedback often elicits a complex behavioral response on the part of the seller that may be di¢ cult to replicate in a controlled experiment. Also, all the artists in our dataset are seasoned sellers. Similar to our study, Cabral and Hortacsu (2005) use panel data to analyze the impact of eBay's reputation rating. Their paper considers data on homogeneous goods, and for the most part the focus is on market outcomes other than the ones considered in this paper. In particular, they consider the impact of feedback on sales growth, the frequency of future negative feedback, and sellers'exit from the market. They also …nd that negative feedback has a signi…cant and sizeable e¤ect on market outcomes.
We view their analysis and the analysis conducted in this paper as complementary.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe the data to be used in the empirical analysis. In section 3 we present the empirical analysis and describe results. An auction on eBay includes a description of the item being auctioned, including pictures.
When posting a new auction, sellers can choose several auction characteristics (e.g., the opening bid). Buyers can browse through thousands of auctions posted every day. Auctions are organized by categories and subcategories, which simpli…es the buyer's search. Buyers can also use a powerful search engine and are also able to request additional information about an auction from the seller anonymously via e-mail. Potential buyers can participate in an active auction at any time over the duration of the auction by submitting a "proxy"
bid. This type of bidding works as follows: as long as a bidder's proxy bid is higher than the second highest bid, she will remain the highest bidder, at a price equal to the second highest bid plus a small increment. When a new bid is submitted, the auction's price is updated accordingly. Proxy bids can be revised (increased) at any time prior to the end of the auction. Only bids above the existing second highest bid, plus an increment, are accepted and recorded. Thus, the number of potential bidders is likely to be larger than the number of bidders recorded by eBay. The highest bidder at the end of the auction wins the item at a price equal to the second highest bid, plus a small increment. For each auction, we collected four di¤erent kinds of information: object-speci…c characteristics, other auction characteristics, bidding history, and artist reputation. Characteristics speci…c to the object being auctioned include information on the height, width, style (abstract, pop, whimsical, etc.), medium (acrylic, oil, etc.) , and ground (stretch canvas, paper, wood, etc.). Other auction characteristics include the opening bid, the shipping and handling fees, and the …nal number of bidders and selling price. At the end of each transaction, the buyer and the seller have a chance to rate their level of satisfaction with the transaction (positive, neutral, negative). We collect data on the type of feedback received by the seller in all previous transactions, which is readily available from eBay. We use these data to de…ne several measures of feedback history: one represents the number of unique buyers prior to the current auction, which could be interpreted as a measure of the artist's customer base on eBay, another one measures the number of negative feedback ratings received, and a third one represents the feedback rating as reported on eBay, which is equal to the number of pos-itive feedbacks divided by the number of positive and negative feedbacks from unique users; neutral feedback does not count. Each of these variables can be interpreted by potential buyers as measures of a seller's reputation.
Several characteristics of these data make them unique. First, the data collected comprise all eBay transactions for a speci…c group of sellers for a long period of time, while the data collected by other researchers usually represents only a narrow snapshot of market activity from a cross-section of sellers. Second, by nature, the intrinsic value of artwork is uncertain, especially in the case of less well-known artists. In contrast, much of the data collected by other researchers refer to homogeneous items or items whose market value can be determined with accuracy, like coins or stamps, which lessens the value of auctions as a selling, price-…nding mechanism. Third, the panel structure of our data allows us to control for sellers'speci…c …xed e¤ects. In contrast, most of the existing econometric research has been conducted using cross-sectional analysis, the exception being Cabral and Hortacsu (2005).
C. Descriptive Statistics.
We report sample descriptive statistics in Tables 1a and 1b. In Table 1a , we divide auctions by year and according to their "Feature Plus!" status. For several years now, eBay has been using a simple form of advertising, or as they call it, "Featured Plus!"(FP).
This type of advertising works as follows: at the time of listing the item on eBay, sellers are given the option of incurring an extra fee in return for having their product listed …rst when buyers search for speci…c items, or when buyers browse a speci…c category, like "art/paintings/abstract". This type of advertising is not cheap, the cost is $19.99 per auction or about 40% of the average sale price of a standard auction. Canals-Cerda (2006) shows that FP status has a signi…cant impact on auction outcomes, including the number of bidders, the sale probability and the …nal sale price. This impact is also re ‡ected in Table 1 . Furthermore, FP auctions are signi…cantly di¤erent from other auctions. In particular, the average size of an FP painting is more than twice that of a painting in a standard auction. To our knowledge, the potential impact of FP has been ignored by the relevant literature. In our empirical analysis we control for FP status as part of our …xed e¤ects strategy. This strategy allows us to compare paintings from the same artist with similar characteristics and with the same FP status. Table 1a Thus, the average frequency of negative feedback from a unique buyer is 0.22%.
Bid values in

Empirical Models and Estimation Results.
Our reduced form econometric analysis is guided by economic theory. The type of eBay auctions that we consider …t well within the framework of an independent private value, ascending-bid, second-price auction subject to some speci…c rules. The seller of the object being auctioned sets the opening bid, s 0 : Each potential bidder, k; assigns a value, v k ; to the object being auctioned. Bidders know and care only about their own valuation. Bids are submitted electronically at any time within the [0; T ] time interval. At any particular time the price of the auction is set at the current second highest bid, and the current, or active, bidders are public information. New bids arrive sequentially at any time during the length of the auction. Any new bid has to surpass the current second highest bid by a minimum increment in order to be recorded. 3 In this framework it is optimal for a bidder to bid her true valuation. Thus, consider an auction with M observed bids, fb k g M k=1 ; from K active bidders, with K N; and N representing the total number of potential bidders; that is, active bidders along with bidders who intended to bid but whose valuation was below the second highest bid at the time they intended to bid. Within this framework, we have three possible scenarios:
with v N 1 ; and v N ; representing the second highest, and the highest, valuation from the group of potential bidders. In order to understand the impact of a seller's reputation on this market it is important to di¤erentiate between the impact on the behavior of the seller and the buyer.
We always observe s 0 : In addition, when the opening bid is low enough we observe However, v N 1 is only observed when s 0 is low enough to attract at least two bidders; otherwise, s 0 represents an upper bound for v N 1 . Thus, in this second case we will employ censored regression techniques. In addition, we also study the impact of seller feedback on the probability of sale, the number of bidders, and the probability of future negative feedbacks.
Given the heterogeneous nature of the data employed in our analysis, we divide the data in groups along several di¤erent dimensions: artist, medium, ground, and Feature Plus! status. More precisely, all paintings from a particular artist, using a particular medium (e.g. oil), on a particular ground (e.g., canvas), and for a speci…c Feature Plus! status will be assigned to a group. This data segmentation skims along with the use of …xed e¤ects (FE) techniques allow us to identify the average e¤ect of explanatory variables (e.g. measures of feedback) from variation in the data within relatively homogeneous groups.
All econometric models considered share a common structure. The endogenous outcome of interest, y ij ; representing the outcome associated with auction i from group j is represented as a function of three components: observed exogenous explanatory variables, X ij ; a group-speci…c …xed e¤ect, j ; and a residual component, " ij ; representing random variation unobserved by the econometrician. Analytically, we consider models of the form
that are estimated using group-speci…c …xed e¤ect (FE) techniques appropriate for each speci…cation to control for potentially endogenous …xed e¤ects. 4 The results from our econometric analysis are presented in Tables 2-7 and are discussed next.
A. Feedback Dynamics.
Understanding how feedback is generated can help us better understand the impact of an artist's feedback on market outcomes. However, sellers on eBay are far from a homogeneous group and it is unlikely that a single theoretical model will be able to explain all types of seller behaviors.
Livingston ( In order to analyze feedback dynamics in our data, we estimate simple linear probability models with artists' speci…c …xed e¤ects and controls for lagged feedback measures and a measure of past sales. 5 The models are estimated using feedback data from unique users (this includes the …rst positive, negative, and neutral feedback received from a buyer, when applicable), which are the exact same data used by eBay to generate its feedback ratings. Table 2 presents results from simple linear probability models, in the spirit of equation (2), where the probability of an artist's receiving a negative feedback in auction t is a function of her feedback history at the beginning of the auction. The estimated coe¢ cients from a simple linear probability model (model 1) and an artist's speci…c …xed e¤ects version of it (model 3) are very di¤erent. Estimation results from model 1 suggest that a one-unit increase in the number of feedback responses increases the probability of negative feedback by 0.0016, a 73% increase with respect to the average unconditional probability 0.00219 (table 1b) .
This result is highly signi…cant. In contrast, estimation results from model 3 suggest that a one-unit increase in the number of negative feedback responses increases the probability of future negative feedback by 0.00043, a 20% increase with respect to the average. This result is insigni…cant. The associated R-square values are very small as expected, as negative feedback is very unusual and, as a result, very di¢ cult to predict. Models 2 and 4 expand on models 1 and 3 by including a control for the number of feedback received in the past.
As one would expect, there is a positive correlation between the feedback received and the negative feedback received. In model 4 we control for the overall total feedback received from 5 Similar results are obtained using conditional FE logit models. We present results from linear probability models because they accept an easier interpretation. unique users. The results indicate that a one-unit increase in negative feedback increases the probability of future negative feedback by 0.00012, a 5% increase, and that an average artist is more likely to receive negative feedback in a transaction if she already has a large number of feedbacks, 10% more likely for an increase in 100 feedbacks; both e¤ects are statistically insigni…cant.
The estimated e¤ect of feedback history on future feedback observed in model one and two are identi…ed from variation in feedback histories over the 17,827 feedback events from unique buyers, while the estimated e¤ect observed in model three and four are identi…ed from within-artists' variation in feedback histories. The results in these last two models suggest that receiving negative feedback today does not have a signi…cant impact on the probability of receiving negative feedback in the future. This suggests that the artists in our sample do not signi…cantly alter the level of e¤ort invested in serving their clients after receiving negative feedback.
B. Artists'Response to Negative Feedback.
If the artist anticipates a change in buyers' behavior as a result of receiving negative feedback, then we would expect a strategic response on her part. This is what we observe in the data.
In table 3 we present estimation results from several log-linear regression model speci…-cations of the opening bid, which is set by the artist, as a function of feedback history and other characteristics speci…c to the artwork being auctioned. All models have been estimated using a …xed e¤ects strategy to control for artist, medium, and ground speci…c e¤ects, as In this subsection we analyze the impact of an increase in an artist's negative feedback rating on the behavior of potential buyers. In particular, we consider the impact on the number of bidders and the probability of sale and the impact on the second highest bidand indirectly on prices. Overall, we observe that the response of potential buyers to an increase in an artist's negative feedback rating is large in magnitude, has the expected sign, and is statistically signi…cant in most cases. Our results contrast with results from the existing literature. We investigate the signi…cance of speci…c econometric model assumptions on results, and highlight the importance of controlling for sellers'speci…c …xed e¤ects.
C.1 The Impact on the Number of Bidders and the Probability of Sale.
The objective here is to analyze results from a reduced form speci…cation of the overall impact of an increase in negative feedback on the number of bidders participating in an auction. However, we should point out that the arrival of potential bidders to an auction is a complex function of artist and artwork characteristics, opening bid, bidders'arrival process, and bidders'bidding behavior. A structural analysis of this process has been conducted in Canals-Cerda and Pearcy (2006) and is not the objective of this study.
In Table 4 we present results from log-linear regression models of the number of bidders, plus one, as a function of characteristics of the artwork being auctioned and artist feedback measures. All models have been estimated using a …xed e¤ects strategy to control for artist-, medium-, and ground-speci…c e¤ects, as well as Feature Plus! status. All estimated models have signi…cant explanatory power, as indicated by R-square values around 0.55. Size is not an important determinant of the number of bidders. The overall number of feedback responses received does not have a signi…cant e¤ect either. In contrast, the average e¤ect of an additional negative feedback is an 8.5% reduction in the number of bidders. This e¤ect is highly signi…cant and consistent across di¤erent model speci…cations. In particular, we observe similar results when we use the standardized eBay feedback measure instead (models 3 and 4). In that case, a higher eBay feedback value increases the number of bidders signi…cantly.
Similarly, in Table 5 we present …xed e¤ects linear probability models for the probability of sale with the same speci…cations as these in Table 4 . The models suggest that size has a negative impact on the sale probability. Thus, this result, along with these from Table 4, suggests that bigger works of art may be more di¢ cult to sell, but that the ones that get sold attract a large number of bidders. With regard to the impact of negative feedback, the coe¢ cient associated to the number of negative feedback responses (models 1 and 2) is large in magnitude and suggests that one additional negative feedback reduces the probability of sale by about 8.5%, in average; however the e¤ect is statistically insigni…cant. In contrast, if we consider the standardized eBay feedback measure instead (models 3 and 4), we also observe a relatively large e¤ect, suggesting that a higher eBay feedback rating is good for sales, and the e¤ect is statistically signi…cant in this case.
C.2 The Impact on the Second Highest Bid.
As indicated in section three, the …nal sale price of an auction is the result of a combination of sellers and buyers'choices. However, we can measure the impact of sellers'feedback on buyers'willingness to pay by concentrating our attention in the second highest bid. As illustrated in equation (1) the second highest bid is only observed in auctions with two or more bidders. Otherwise, the opening bid, for auctions with a single bidder or with no bidders, represents an upper bound to the second highest bid. Thus, it is appropriate in this framework to employ censored regression techniques to analyze the impact of a seller's feedback on the …nal auction price. Formally, consistent with equation (2), consider a log-linear speci…cation for the second highest bid,
where the second highest bid, v N 1;ij ; is observed when v N 1;ij s 0;it ; with s 0;ij representing the opening bid. Thus consider y it = ln v N 1;ij and c it = ln s 0;it : We observe M ax (y it ; c it ) ; or after a transformation, y it = y it c it = 0 + j c it + X ij + " ij ; the equivalent expression M ax (y it ; 0) : We estimate this …xed e¤ects censored regression model using semiparametric estimation techniques developed in Honore (1992) and surveyed in Arellano and Honore (2005) ; and use the bootstrap method with 100 repetitions to generate t-values. 6 The basic idea of the estimation technique is to "de…ne pairs of 'residuals'that depend on the individual speci…c e¤ect in exactly the same way. Intuitively, this implies that di¤erencing the residuals will eliminate the …xed e¤ects" (Arellano and Honore, 2005) . A detailed description of the approach can be found in these references.
Estimation results are presented in Tables 6a and 6b with associated …xed e¤ects for groups de…ned by artist, medium, and ground, as well as Feature Plus! status, as with other prior speci…cations. For comparison purposes with previous research that has not considered …xed e¤ects strategies to control for sellers'speci…c e¤ects, we also estimate a model that includes …xed e¤ects to control for medium, and ground, and Feature Plus! status, in order to reduce heterogeneity across observations, but not artist-speci…c e¤ects; results from this exercise are presented in Table 7 . Table 6b presents estimation results from several model speci…cations that di¤er on the set of control variables. 7 As with most previous speci…cations, size is an important determinant of value. A one square foot increase in size is associated with a 19% average statistically signi…cant increase in the second highest bid. A one-unit increase in negative feedback is associated with an average loss in value between 6.3% and 8%, depending on the model speci…cation; this e¤ect is statistically signi…cant. The estimation results from Table   7a are very similar, except for the caveat that the measured e¤ect of the standardized eBay feedback rating is not statistically signi…cant, although it is large in magnitude in all model speci…cations. With regard to this last result, observe that two sellers with the same number of negative feedback will have di¤erent eBay feedback ratings unless their overall number of feedback is the same. Thus, one possible interpretation of the non-signi…cant result is that the standardized eBay feedback rating represents a noisy measure of reputation and as such the associated impact is not estimated accurately.
D. How Do Our Results Compare with the Existing Literature?
Our analysis shows that the impact of reputation on the behavior of buyers and sellers and on market outcomes is signi…cant statistically and in magnitude. As we indicate in the introduction most existing studies of the impact of reputation on eBay have been conducted using cross-sectional analysis techniques. The results in general suggest that reputation has a signi…cant impact on the sale price, but this impact is small in magnitude. Livingston 4 Conclusions.
The existing literature on the impact of reputation using eBay data suggests a marginally signi…cant, and small in magnitude, impact of reputation on sale price. In contrast, our results point to a signi…cant statistically-signi…cant, and large in magnitude, impact of reputation on the behavior of buyers and sellers and on market outcomes. More precisely, on average a negative feedback is associated with an 8.5% reduction in the number of bidders and the probability of sale; it is also associated with a signi…cant reduction in buyers' willingness to pay, anywhere between 6.3% and 8%. Furthermore, after receiving negative feedback, the artist increases the opening bid in upcoming auctions by about 20% on average. One possible interpretation of this empirical result is that it measures the strategic response of the artist to a decrease in interest for her work. Thus, our results suggest that, at least for auctions of heterogeneous goods of uncertain value, the seller's reputation matters. Fixed effects models include control for artist specific effects. Fixed effects include control for artist specific effects, medium, ground and Feature Plus! Status. eBay feedback has been standardized. Fixed effects include control for artist specific effects, medium, ground and Feature Plus! Status. eBay feedback has been standardized. Fixed effects include control for artist specific effects, medium, ground and Feature Plus! Status. eBay feedback has been standardized. Fixed effects include control for artist specific effects, medium, ground and Feature Plus! Status. eBay feedback has been standardized. T-values computed using bootstrap and 100 repetitions. Fixed effects include control for artist specific effects, medium, ground and Feature Plus! Status. eBay feedback has been standardized. T-values computed using bootstrap and 100 repetitions. Fixed effects include control for medium, ground and Feature Plus! Status but not for artist specific effects. eBay feedback has been standardized. T-values computed using bootstrap and 100 repetitions.
